We derive a simplified version of the model of Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 2011] and show how this approximate model is useful in explaining choice under risk. We show that in the simple case of three outcomes, the model can generate indifference curves that "fan out" in the Marshack-Machina triangle, and thus can explain the well-known Allais and common ratio paradoxes that models such as prospect theory and regret theory are designed to capture. At the same time, our model is consistent with modern macroeconomic theory and evidence and generates predictions across a much wider set of domains than these models.
Introduction
of the "standard model" of maximizing expected discounted utility. Their self-control model is based on the idea that a more rational "long run self" controls the impulses of a "short run self" that is very tempted by immediate rewards.
2 Fudenberg and Levine [2006] points out that the self-control model can explain "time-domain" phenomena, such as a preference for commitment and time-inconsistent choice. Moreover, when the model is enriched with the assumption of mental accounts or "pocket cash constraints" it can also explain the very high levels of small-stakes risk aversion seen in the lab, a quantitative puzzle that has become known as the Rabin paradox, after Rabin [2000] . Fudenberg and Levine [2011] show that the same model can also explain the interaction of risk and delay seen in such experiments as Baucells and Heukamp [2010] and Keren and Roelofsma [1995] . Moreover they move beyond the qualitative matching of theories and facts that is typical in this literature to a quantitative calibration of the model to both
Rabin-paradox data and the Allais paradox. 3 Unfortunately the model of Fudenberg and Levine [2011] is fairly complex, which may obscure some of the key insights and make it difficult for others to apply the model. Our purpose here it to develop a somewhat simpler approximation to this model that is still accurate enough to be useful in applied work. After developing this approximation, we characterize its theoretical properties and show how it helps explain Maniadis: Bocconi University, Department of Decision Sciences and Carlo F. Dondena Center, Via Roentgen 1, Milan 20136, Italy (email: zacharias.maniadis@unibocconi.it) . 2 While the model is intended as a very precise model of the internal processes underlying self-control, at a very rough level the model is consistent with fMRI evidence, since the "long run self" is identified with activation in the prefrontal cortex while the short run self corresponds to more primitive and faster-acting parts of the brain. See e.g. McClure et al. [2004 McClure et al. [ , 2007 for fMRI evidence that support this general idea. 3 One caveat is that the model described here, like Levine [2006, 2011] , assumes a short run self who lives only for a single period. For this reason the model, like quasi-hyperbolic discounting, implies that only the current period's rewards are tempting. This stark conclusion is not suitable for analyzing some aspects of the timing of decisions, such as the marginal interest rates found in the experiment of Myerson observed behavior in the Allais paradox and common ratio paradoxes and examine the implications of the theory for intransitivity.
To study decision makers who act as if tempted by money winnings but also manage to save, as well as to explain the level of risk aversion observed in lab experiments, Fudenberg and Levine [2006] use the idea of mental accounting: A decision maker reduces the cost of restraining impulsive decisions by using mental accounting to commit to daily expenditures -the idea is that the mental account is set when the decision maker is in a "cool state" and not subject to temptation. By assumption, the commitment is to net expenditures, and not to consumption per se, so small losses must be born out of daily expenditures and small gains create a self-control problem. This results in the marginal propensity to consume out of small gains being large -one in fact. 4 Because small losses and small gains are applied entirely to daily expenditures and not spread over the lifetime, the decision maker is much more risk averse over small unexpected lotteries than under the classical model, where any change in wealth results in a much smaller permanent change in consumption over the individual's lifetime.
A second consequence of this theory is that if there is an increasing marginal cost of self-control then the decision maker's utility is not linear in probabilities and so this is not an expected utility theory. Moreover, while any form of nonlinearity makes the model depart from expected utility, the increasing-marginal-cost specification predicts the and Green [1995] . A more realistic version of the model, in which short run selves are less patient than the long run self without being completely myopic, is developed in Fudenberg and Levine [2012] . 4 This is consistent with psychological evidence that people need justification in order to spend money on "vices", which offer short-term gratification but low long-term benefit (Kivetz and Zheng, 2006) . Earning small unexpected amounts provides such justification. Accordingly, people will tend to spend these amounts immediately on temptation goods, which they would not otherwise purchase.
particular violations of the independence axiom seen in, for example, the Allais, common-ratio and other related paradoxes, as detailed in Fudenberg and Levine [2011] .
Our goal here is to introduce a simple approximate version of the theory that can be used to study data on risk and lotteries. A key simplification is the assumption that the long-run value function is risk neutral, that is, that the marginal utility of savings is a constant. This is a good approximation to decisions that have little impact on lifetime wealth; it simplifies the model by replacing an unknown non-linear value function with a known linear value function. We also assume that the interest received over a single period (the "temptation horizon" of the short run self) is small enough to be ignored; this fits with the usual calibration of this period length to be one to three days. We use the simplified model to explain how the theory ranks general small-stakes money lotteries, and illustrate this in the context of lotteries with only three possible outcomes in the gains domain using the classic Marschak-Machina depiction of indifference curves in the corresponding probability simplex. We also illustrate how the model leads to intransitivity.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we derive the approximate version of the dual-self model. In Section 3 we study its properties using a series of
propositions. In Section 4 we examine the special case of a single gamble with a unique positive prize. Section 5 addresses the very interesting case of choices in menus of two lotteries, with three possible outcomes. We show how the model predicts well-known paradoxes that violate expected utility and illustrate this in the Marschak-Machina triangle. Section 6 provides a general discussion and concludes.
Deriving an Approximate Dual-Self Model
We will remind the reader of the main ingredients of the Levine [2006, 2011] When studying a fixed individual and holding fixed that individual's initial wealth and preferences, we can suppress the dependence on x and take short-run utility to be
, where ' 0 u > and " 0 u < . In the remainder of the paper, the term "consumption" will refer to this incremental consumption.
We are primarily interested in how the agent chooses lotteries Z from a fixed menu ℑ , where each of the lotteries resolves in the current period. In other words, current utility depends on current consumption and the cost of self-control, which is increasing in "foregone utility," the difference between the utility the "short-run self" would have liked and what he actually got:
, which is non-positive. We assume that g is a smooth, non-decreasing, weakly convex function satisfying
The model of Levine [2006, 2011] is not static, but considers an infinite horizon problem. It is well known that the recursive structure of the maximization problem allows us to represent future utility by means of a "value function" v , computed by optimizing beginning in period 2. This function has as its argument total wealth 
Following Levine [2006, 2011] we assume that the lottery is unanticipated. 7 Since pocket cash is chosen when the agent is not subject to temptation, the agent can obtain the optimal consumption path of someone who faces no self-control 6 Strictly speaking what matters is not total wealth and consumption but discretionary wealth and consumption, that is, net of expenditures such as rent and medical care that are committed in advance and do not pose a temptation. 7 Or that the probability is small enough not to have had an appreciable impact on the choice of pocket cash.
costs, without using any self-control. This is achieved by setting 0 c = : in this case absent any windfalls the agent is not able to consume more than the first-best consumption level, and so faces no temptation to consume more. Hence 0 c = is the optimal level, and so
This function is non-positive, smooth, strictly increasing, weakly concave function on − ℜ satisfying '(0) 1 h ≥ . It inherits these properties from g .
Also define
(2) ( )
We will now approximate V for small gambles. ( , *, , ) ( , *, ) In comparison to Levine [2006, 2011] , this model assumes that no interest is paid on money found, earned, or saved during the first period, which fits with the idea that the length of a period is measured in days. Further, as an approximation, first period savings are assumed not to change the marginal present value of period two value.
If in fact savings are an appreciable portion of lifetime wealth, this approximation understates risk aversion.
Observe that for a given menu ℑ of lotteries
is a constant, and since the agent will pick the optimal consumption plan, for small Z the agent's preferences over lotteries can be represented by the approximate objective function
Since consumption cannot exceed the amount earned by the prize, the problem is:
Maximizing with respect to i c for a given realization of the lottery i z , gives the consumption function * c ɶ as the implicit solution of ( )
9 For any specification of c ɶ, let ˆ( ) z c ɶ be the unique solution of ( )
Our objective is to express the consumer's preferences for lotteries in terms of this unique threshold. Adding and subtracting ( ) Eu Z inside of h and using the linearity of expectation we have: 9 Notice that the aforementioned condition is exactly the same for every 1, 2,... ( )
. Substituting in gives the desired result.
Choice from Menus of Lotteries
We now suppose that the decision maker faces a menu ℑ of lotteries on [ , ] x y − where , 0 x y > and y is "small" relative to lifetime wealth. As above, we suppose that the agent does not expect to face this menu.
The approximate utility for opportunity set ℑ , threshold z and lottery 0 Z ≥ is given by Theorem 2 as
To reiterate, the first term h represents the combination of utility received from immediate consumption and the cost of controlling the desire to spend even more. The second term represents the long-term benefit of the amount that is saved: this is not subject to a self-control problem, but is spread over the entire lifetime, and as indicated we approximate the corresponding risk as negligible so that the utility from savings is linear.
Notice that in general the ranking of lotteries is menu dependent, as it depends not only on the lottery Z that is being assessed, but also the utility * u from the lottery that yields the greatest short-run utility. This represents a temptation: spend all the money right away, and choose the lottery that maximizes the expected utility from doing so.
However, when h is linear the ranking does not depend on * u .
Properties of the Approximate Model
The next result shows how to determine the value of the threshold ẑ above which all of the (unexpected) lottery payoff is saved. 
To see that ( *, , ) U u Z z is differentiable with respect to z at ẑ z = we compute that its derivative is equal to zero. Observe first that ( *, , )
U u Z i is certainly differentiable unless î z z = for some i and regardless, the left and right derivatives exist. We will complete the proof by showing that both are equal to zero at ẑ z = . The derivative has the form 
which vanishes at ẑ by the earlier characterization of ẑ . The same applies when i z z = in the negative direction.
The properties of ( , )
F Z z may be established by differentiating with respect to z .
Proposition 4: If h is linear then the decision-maker ranks lotteries according to
Proof: In this case the objective function is
, and observing that In addition to menu independence, Proposition 4 shows that in the linear case the independence axiom is satisfied: lotteries are ranked according to an expected utility and the weak axiom of revealed preference is satisfied. However, the linear model cannot explain choices such as the common ratio or Allais paradox that violate the independence axiom, nor can it explain the interaction of risk and delay (Baucells and Heukamp, 2010; Keren and Roelofsma, 1995) , or the "compromise effect" (Simonson, 1989) .
Even when h is not linear, the preferences still correspond to an expected utility theory on particular pairs of lotteries, namely those with "all small outcomes" and those all of whose outcomes are large. The next two propositions say this formally:
Proposition 5: Define C z as the unique solution of ( ) 
that the first order condition is satisfied. Then, Proposition 3 implies that 0 arg max ( *, , )
, and plugging back into the objective function, we get ( )
In other words, the decision-maker is risk neutral with respect to relatively large positive lotteries. This says that the decision maker uses the short-run utility function to evaluate sufficiently small lotteries.
The suggestion of these results is that if h is strictly concave rather than linear, then for lotteries with outcomes that do not lie entirely above the cutoff C z or entirely below the cutoff L z the theory need not be an expected utility theory, and so may exhibit reversals such as those exhibited in the Allais or common ratio paradoxes.
Proposition 7: Preferences over lotteries are consistent with stochastic dominance.
Proof: Quiggin [1989] has shown that one lottery first order stochastically dominates another if and only if the lotteries can be realized as random variables on a common probability space, such that every realization of the dominant lottery is at least as great as the corresponding realization of the dominated lottery. Hence it is sufficient to consider whether utility is non-decreasing in the vector of values of Z . Since the objective function is
this is non-decreasing in the vector of values of Z , the same is true for max ( *, , )
Hence, our model predicts that people will tend to choose a lottery that is "clearly better" than another (dominated) lottery. "Better" is in the sense that any given monetary payoff is offered with at least as high probability as in the dominated lottery.
Found Money
A key role in the analysis is played by the cutoff L z , which is the solution to
To get an idea of how this cutoff works, it is interesting to examine the simplest possible decision problem: that of found money. Here ℑ is a singleton containing a single lottery that delivers a certain amount ζ . This can correspond to finding the amount ζ on the street. While in standard theory such gains will be spread over the entire lifetime, here when the amount is small, that is, less than the cutoff L z , it will all be spent. Although this sounds like the description of the threshold ẑ , the cutoff L z is different, and we will try to explain why.
When the agent finds money ζ the temptation is to spend all of it, so * ( ) u u ζ = .
If the amount found is small, then the approximation we have introduced is valid, and the agent will choose consumption c to maximize
depends on the earned amount ζ .
Now we use an example to illustrate the role of the cutoff L z , which, unlike ẑ , does not depend on ζ . Assume logarithmic utility ( ) log( ) u c x c = + , where x is the exogenously given pocket cash, and also that ( )
, and the objective function is
Setting the derivative of this with respect to c equal to zero gives 
Optimal consumption for each level of ζ is depicted in the 2-dimensional plane in Figure 1 .
[FIGURE 1 SOMEWHERE HERE]
Remember that the role of the threshold ẑ is that if the realization of the lottery is higher than it, then consumption is ẑ , but if the realization is less than ẑ , then consumption is equal to the realization. Here since the lottery is deterministic, the realization corresponding to ζ is simply ζ . The ˆ( ) z ζ line starts above zero, and it crosses the 45 -degree line once at a point greater than zero. The cutoff point 
Note in particular that in this case consumption goes to infinity as found money goes to infinity, even though the fraction that is spent goes to zero.
Three-Outcome Gambles
To better understand the implications of self-control preferences for choices among lotteries we examine lotteries with just three outcomes. This very simple case is sufficient to illustrate some of the best-known departures from expected utility theory, namely as the Allais paradox 11 and the common ratio effect 12 (Allais, 1953; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 Machina [1987] illustrates how the above stated anomalies, which violate the expected utility benchmark, can be captured by indifference curves that "fan out", or become steeper as one moves towards the northwest part of the triangle. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate and explain how fanning-out curves can generate the Allais paradox and the common ratio effect (respectively). Our objective in this section is to show that indifference curves with these characteristics can also be generated by our simple model, which therefore captures these departures from expected utility.
[FIGURE 2 SOMEWHERE HERE] [FIGURE 3 SOMEWHERE HERE]
11 The paradox concerns choices between pairs of lotteries. We will remind readers of the original Allais experiment, which involves two choice scenarios. In Scenario I, Lottery s gives $1m (one million) with probability 1.00 and Lottery r gives $1m with probability 0.89, $5m with probability 0.10 and $0 with probability 0.01. In Scenario II, Lottery ' s gives $1m with probability 0.11 and $0 with probability 0.89 and Lottery ' r gives $5m with probability 0.10 and $0 with probability 0.90. Some subjects choose Lottery s in Scenario I but Lottery ' r in Scenario II, which violates expected utility. The Allais paradox is part of a more general effect, called the "common consequence" effect. 12 In experiments of the common ratio effect, there is also choice among pairs of lotteries, where each lottery involves the zero outcome and either outcome A or B , where 0 A B < < . In Scenario 1, the small outcome ( A ) offered with a high probability ( π ) is preferred over the large outcome ( B ) with a low probability ( ρ ). However, when in Scenario 2 the probability for both positive outcomes is multiplied by the same number 0 1 ξ < < , the choice is reversed in favor of the lottery with the large outcome.
For simplicity and because the Allais and common ratio paradoxes have this form, we consider only the gains domain, and moreover assume that the worst possible outcome is zero ( 1 0 z = ). We assume that '(0) 1 h > so that by Proposition 3 1ẑ z < .
13
Also recall from Proposition 6 that if 3 L z z ≤ then preferences are just those of the short-run self. To avoid this uninteresting case we assume that 3
14 As benchmarks, consider first constant expected value curves (those of a risk neutral agent) so that indifference curves in the triangle are given by lines of the form
As a second benchmark, consider indifference curves for the short-run self which are given by lines of the form 3 3 2 1 2 1
Because the short run self is risk averse, its indifference curves have a steeper slope than those of the risk neutral agent.
Turning to the self-control case, we will consider choices between pairs of gambles, that is menus with two items,
. The utility to the gamble p in the menu { , } p q is given by
We may now define the indifference set
Notice that this relation is 13 This highlights a special role of 0: it is less than the threshold ẑ except in the non-self-control case where '(0) 0 h = .
14 To see that the latter inequality follows, note that if 3ẑ z ≤ then plugging in (*) would imply that L z z = , which entails a contradiction to our assumption that 3
reflexive but need not be transitive. To understand more clearly the indifference set, consider that it is defined implicitly by max (max{ ( ), ( )}, , ) max (max{ ( ), ( )}, , ) 0
We wish to examine the slope of this indifference set in the Marschak-Machina triangle. For this, we need to invoke the implicit function theorem and therefore need to
show that this expression is continuously differentiable, at least in some neighborhood.
The key fact is that it is indeed differentiable with respect to q at least in an open neighborhood of q p = and at all points where
. To see this, evaluate the utility difference at the optimal value of z , that is, ˆ, p q z z :
We shall show that the indirect effects of a marginal change of q through its effect on * u and ˆ, p q z z can be ignored (in a neighborhood of q p = ). First, the derivative of Φ with respect to * u is zero at q p = , since
Second, the derivative with respect to ˆk z is zero by Proposition 3. 15 Note that ˆk z is implicitly determined by the relation In order for the indifference curves to fan out in such a manner that they explain the paradoxes, we need their slope to increase as we move towards the northwest of the triangle. We shall show that this is the case, because as we move in that direction the threshold ẑ increases. Intuitively we expect that higher ẑ corresponds to a more difficult self-control problem and that this should result in preferences -that is slopes of indifference curves -less like that of the long-run risk neutral self and more like the steeper sloped short-run indifference curves. This is verified by the next result. 
In particular, it can be written as a function
where Σ is strictly increasing in ẑ .
{ } ( )
(located at the origin) with a risky lottery r that has a positive return, so it lies above the risk neutral indifference curve (the thick line crossing s ). The data indicate that the latter tends to get rejected as too risky, so it has to lie below the actual indifference curve -the dashed line crossing s . In the figure the alternative Lottery r lies to the upper right in between the two indifference curves; so indeed, Lottery s will be preferred.
FIGURE 4 SOMEWHERE HERE] [FIGURE 5 SOMEWHERE HERE]
the right leads to a new lottery ' s , whose indifference curve does not have a different slope than ( ) I s , hence no reversal occurs.
This shows the importance of the fact that in the Allais experiments there is a large difference in the short-run expected payoffs across the two scenarios. It is the convexity in the self-control function that leads to reversals when the difference in these expected payoffs is sufficiently high. Now consider the common ratio paradox as depicted in Figure 3 . In Scenario I the agent has a choice between a Lottery s with a high probability 2 s of winning outcome 2 z (or else yields zero) and a more risky Lottery r , which has a certain chance 3 2 r s < of winning 3 z (or else zero). Again, the choice of s , which is observed in the data, corresponds to the case where lottery r lies between the risk-neutral indifference curve and the actual (steeper) indifference curve crossing s . In Scenario II, r shifts down and to the right, while s shifts to the right (notice that the vector from s to r gets shorter but continues to point in the same direction). If the indifference curve gets flatter there can again be a reversal.
This time the reversal occurs whether or not 3 p is smaller than 3 p , because not only does 1 p get larger, but also 3 p gets smaller and that always flattens the indifference curve. Note the implication here: this theory predicts that common ratio paradoxes hold for a wider variety of parameter values than common consequence, since the latter only occur below 3 p . The reason that common ratio scenarios always generate reversals in the approximate dual self model is that the short-run payoffs in the second scenario are always a fixed fraction of the payoffs in the initial scenario (assuming (0) 0 u = ), regardless of the position of the initial-scenario lotteries in the triangle.
( ) ( ) models generate "indifference curves" that cross under certain assumptions; they can also explain the common ratio and common consequence effects.
Discussion and Conclusion
We have examined how the assumption of a linear long-run value function can lead to a more tractable model than the model of Fudenberg and Levine [2011] , and we
showed how this simplified model is useful in explaining choice among lotteries. The model respects stochastic dominance, and for lotteries with very low and very high possible prizes, lottery choice corresponds to the maximization of short-run expected utility and expected value, respectively. Restricting attention to the case of two lotteries with three outcomes, we show how the model can generate indifference curves that "fan out" and thus can explain the well-known Allais and common ratio paradoxes.
As we have pointed out, models such as "expected regret" can capture the static risk-based anomalies that we have discussed here, and in addition generate the classic preference reversal phenomenon and other paradoxes. However, the general dual-self model has a wider scope, in the sense that it is consistent with a large number of facts, across different domains. In particular, the model has predictions about time-related phenomena (such as preference reversals for delayed rewards), risk-related phenomena (such as the ones described here), contextual psychological phenomena (such as the effect of cognitive load), etc. At the same time, the model is consistent with modern macroeconomic theory and evidence. In addition, the derivation of risk preference and reversals from an underlying model of self-control has implications about correlations between an individual's choices between lotteries and her choices in other domains that are not present in alternative theories such as prospect theory. It also makes predictions that the same individual may make different choices between lotteries depending on other decision problems that have recently been faced. In effect the h function is determined by past behavior and personal characteristics.
Psychological evidence indicates that self-control depends on a resource that resembles "strength" or a "muscle" Baumeister 1998, Baumeister et al. 1998 ). In particular, repeated use of self-control within short time intervals depletes the "stock of willpower", and rest is needed in order to for this stock to recover. Further, like a muscle, the ability to exercise self-control can be enlarged by repeatedly exercising it.
This time dimension in self-control is analyzed in Fudenberg and Levine [2012] . In particular an individual who has recently faced difficult self-control problems -and so depleted her stock of self-control -will exhibit a higher cost of self-control as measured by h . Second, different individuals have different degrees of past exercise of selfcontrol, and therefore different capacities of using it. There is some evidence that the ability to exercise self-control is heterogeneous and correlated with such positive outcomes as scholarly achievement, interpersonal skills, and less alcohol abuse (Tagney, Baumeister and Boone, 2004) . So for example we may expect individuals who have a history of addiction and alcohol abuse to have a higher cost of self-control as measured by h . Finally, as shown in O' Donoghue and Rabin [1999] self-control costs imply an individual exhibits present bias. Hence we may expect individuals who exhibit greater present bias to have a higher cost of self-control as measured by h . 
